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visual and auditory stimuli in Simple Reaction Time and Choice Reaction Time tasks. 
Bias analysis showed that even the easily distinguishable sounds and colored lights in the 
CRT tasks were not fully equivalent (a result that was supported in later studies), but the 
lead hypothesis could be tested by looking at interactions between sample and sensory 
(auditory/visual) modality. There was no support for the McLuhan hypothesis (Poortin-
ga, 1971). 
Also in other studies on risk-taking, measured with experimental tasks, and on curi-
osity (associated with exploratory behavior and arousal) Black-White differences turned 
out to be minor. All in all, there were two lessons that I had learned by the early 1970s: 
first, human psychological functioning is very similar in Africa and the West (and pre-
sumably the rest of the world); and second, issues of bias and lack of equivalence (in-
comparability) can distort cross-cultural differences, even for very simple tasks. As a 
consequence, I started to focus on psychometric and methodological conditions for valid 
cross-cultural comparison.
Video clip from Ype Poortinga's talk
Emphasis on Cross-Cultural Differences 
Through much of the history of cross-cultural psychology one can observe a recur-
rent theme: some sweeping cross-cultural difference in psychological functioning is 
being postulated that subsequently needs to be redressed in the light of more precise 
empirical analysis. This has happened with perception and cognition; an early com-
pensatory theory to the effect that, relative to Westerners, “primitive” peoples had a 
heightened sharpness of the senses but poorer cognitive development has disappeared 
without leaving a trace. It has happened in cognition where Vygotsky believed in the 
cultural mediation of all human functioning beyond reflexes, and Cole and colleagues 
(e.g., Scribner & Cole, 1981), while endorsing the principle of mediation, showed that 
the alleged major divide in thinking between literates and illiterates was a matter of al-
gorithms taught in western style school education. It has happened in psycholinguistics 
where the well-known Sapir-Whorf hypothesis to the effect that a language is an im-
portant determinant of the formation of thoughts and ideas has dwindled to a factor with 
limited reach in color perception and spatial orientation (e.g., Dasen & Mishra, 2010). 
It has happened in emotion research where the claim of emotions being “cultural rather 
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Prefatory Comments
In this roundtable discussion I will advocate balancing psychological invariance and cultural variation.  There 
are large and evident differences between the behavior repertoires of human groups. Cross-cultural researchers 
have endeavored to explain such differences in terms of broad and inclusive sociocultural dimensions, styles and 
traits. Among other contributions to this roundtable, I will argue that psychological patterning of cross-cultural 
differences is much less coherent than our literature tends to suggest. Admittedly, this is a serious challenge; if 
correct, it implies that cross-cultural psychology tends to engage in cultural stereotyping.
One early experience had a major influence on my orientation in cross-cultural psy-
chology. While working on my PhD I had the opportunity to participate in a project 
meant to survey the psychological competences of the Bushmen or San in the Kalahari 
Desert. Their hunting and gathering way of life was threatened at the time (1960s) and 
the question was whether there could be some other feasible mode of economic sub-
sistence. From an array of tests, with craftily constructed item formats and instructions 
that made sense for the Bushmen, it emerged that principles of perception (e.g., symme-
try, Gestalt similarities) and cognition (e.g., abstract reasoning) functioned in much the 
same way among people essentially living in the Stone Age as among western urbanized 
university students (Reuning & Wortley, 1973). In addition, the Bushmen were extreme-
ly skillful (by western standards) in dealing with the demands of their environment and 
had sophisticated technology (e.g., in hunting). I went to the Kalahari with fuzzy but 
strong beliefs about big differences in the psychological make-up of illiterates and edu-
cated westerners; when I came back these implicit convictions had been shaken badly.
 The background question for my own PhD research was to find an explanation for 
the large differences in cognitive ability tests between Black and White groups in South 
Africa. It was clear that differences in test score distributions could not be compared 
at face value, but behavior differences were seen as pervasive and as reflecting differ-
ences in psychological functioning. A then popular idea was the McLuhan hypothesis, 
also called Biesheuvel’s hypothesis, to the effect westerners were more oriented towards 
the visual modality (think of reading) and Africans more towards the auditory modali-
ty or auditory-kinesthetic modality (think of music and rhythm). At the time, Informa-
tion Theory was a frontier development and I set out to compare samples of black and 
white students on elementary scales of visual (brightness) and auditory (loudness) infor-
mation transmission capacity, and to compare their information transmission speed for 
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quency Database ALFRED; http://alfred.med.yale.edu/alfred) and this has been inter-
preted as an antecedent to higher collectivism (Chiao & Ambady, 2007). In recent years 
there has been a shift from population differences in frequencies of some polymorphism 
to the study of interactions of such frequencies with psychological variables. For one al-
lele (of three alleles) of an oxytocin receptor gene locus a significant culture by religiosi-
ty interaction was found suggesting that high religiosity predicts more psychological dis-
tress in European Americans and less distress in Koreans; with the same polymorphism 
interactions were found for emotional support seeking under distress and for emotional 
suppression (see Kim & Sasaki, 2014). Although the size of samples tends to be much 
higher than in fMRI research, such gene-behavior association studies are still seriously 
underpowered. 
There is an urgent need for stipulating more precise pathways linking genes and be-
havior and for discriminant validation of findings. At the same time, even minor differ-
ences in genetic make-up across populations possibly may account for long-term and 
cross-situationally consistent differences in behavior tendencies. This is the reason why 
cultural neuroscience has exciting potential for the critical examination of major psycho-
cultural dimensions that are central to much of cross-cultural psychology.
Conclusion
To avoid a misunderstanding, my argument is not with extensive differences in be-
havior manifestations between groups of people; the behavior repertoire of the Bushmen 
can hardly be called “similar” to that of urbanized westerners. Nevertheless, since the 
field trip to the Kalahari Desert mentioned above, I have been skeptical of the emphasis 
on differences in major hypothetical constructs that is a hallmark of our literature and 
easily leads to stereotyped views of “others”. I have no good answer to the lead ques-
tion of this contribution, except that there appears to exist a fascination with differenc-
es which cross-cultural psychology may have inherited from (or at least is sharing with) 
cultural anthropology. A balance needs to be sought between cross-cultural invariance 
and variation of behavior. In my view this requires satisfying two conditions. First, we 
have to shore up the methodological quality of our designs and make the testing of our 
hypotheses much stricter. The second condition is that we should recognize biology, in-
cluding ethology and human ethology, as a foundational science of our field next to cul-
tural anthropology. As I have argued elsewhere (Poortinga, 2011, p.563): “Our field is 
uniquely placed both to contribute to and to counterbalance the biological revolution in 
psychology, since cross-cultural research brings a much needed range of behavior varia-
tion, which can help to put into question too easy invocations of genetic determinants.” 
I realize that this entails a major extension of our traditional domain, but looking back 
over half a century of research it appears to me that cross-cultural psychology is like the 
universe, it keeps on expanding.
natural” has been countered by evidence of large scale invariance (e.g., in the structure 
of emotion components, Fontaine, Scherer, & Soriano, 2013; and in the cross-cultur-
ally shared characteristics of an emotion even in a language that has no separate word 
for it; Breugelmans & Poortinga, 2006). Currently the widest remaining claims are for 
the East-West distinction of individualism-collectivism or interdependent-independent 
construal of the self, but even this towering giant may be standing on clay feet. Of nu-
merous findings going against expectations derived from the distinction I mention two. 
Yamagishi, Hashimoto and Schug (2008) in a replication of the famous pen choos-
ing experiment showed that the East-West difference in preferences may not be rooted 
in different values but in different situational default strategies. In their extensive me-
ta-analysis Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier (2002, Abstract) reported: "European 
Americans were not more individualistic than African Americans, or Latinos, and not 
less collectivistic than Japanese or Koreans.” 
 A bias towards differences over cross-cultural invariance (similarities) has been 
demonstrated explicitly by Brouwers et al. (2004) who found that in the Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology far more often postulated differences were not supported by 
data than postulated similarities. This finding can be seen as a precursor of the more re-
cent challenge to Null Hypothesis Statistical Testing (e.g., Simmons, Nelson, & Simon-
sohn, 2011) that also applies to our field. The null hypothesis remains an elegant device 
in experiments where researchers have control over treatments and subjects are allocat-
ed randomly to the various treatments. However, it is hardly a serious proposition when 
both control on treatments and random allocation of respondents are violated systemati-
cally, as is the case in virtually all cross-cultural research. 
A fascinating recent development, cultural neuroscience, unfortunately is vulnerable 
to the same methodological weaknesses as earlier research traditions. In the most fre-
quent design fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) is registered in small sam-
ples of East Asians and European Americans under a few treatment conditions. Howev-
er, with a very large number of voxels (small brain loci) and few participants significant 
findings are bound to occur for statistical reasons, (Vul, Harris, Winkielman & Pashler, 
2009). Typically there are no predictions of differences between the samples in some 
a priori specified brain region or well-defined neurophysiological pathway; as a conse-
quence, a wide range of outcomes can be interpreted to support an East-West distinc-
tion.
A second strand of cultural neuroscience is searching for associations of variations 
between Asians and European Americans in the frequency distributions of some genet-
ic polymorphism in neurotransmitter receptor genes (serotonin, dopamine) or hormones 
(oxytocin). Initially such studies addressed differences in frequency distributions. For 
example, in the promoter region of serotonin transporter protein 5-HTT a person can 
have a longer sequence or a shorter sequence of repeats. The former is more present in 
East Asian groups (up to .90) than in European groups (up to .67; see the Allele Fre-
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